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PRIVACY HARM EXCEPTIONALISM
RYAN CALO
“Exceptionalism” refers to the belief that a person, place, or thing is
qualitatively different from others in the same basic category. Thus,
some have spoken of America’s exceptionalism as a nation.1 Early
debates about the Internet focused on the prospect that existing laws and
institutions would prove inadequate to govern the new medium of
cyberspace. Scholars have made similar claims about other areas of law.
The focus of this short essay is the supposed exceptionalism of
privacy. Rather than catalogue all the ways that privacy might differ
from other concepts or areas of study, I intend to focus on the narrow but
important issue of harm. I will argue that courts and some scholars
require a showing of harm in privacy out of proportion with other areas
of law. Many also assume, counterintuitively, that the information
industry somehow differs from virtually every other industry in
generating no real externalities.
I.
Harm is a prerequisite to recovery in many contexts. For a plaintiff
to recover in tort, for instance, she must almost always show damage of
some kind. Many statutes require injury as an element.2 For the Federal
Trade Commission to bring an action under its authority to protect
consumers from unfair practice, the practice at issue must “cause or [be]
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.”3
But harm presents an especially acute challenge in the context of
privacy. Courts generally demand that privacy plaintiffs show not just
harm, but concrete, fundamental, or “special” harm before they can
recover.4 Take the case of Doe v. Chao, in which the Supreme Court
1. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD 18 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1996) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 51 (Knopf 1948) (referring to America as “qualitatively” different from other
nations)).
2. E.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
4. See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257 (D. Conn. 2008) (requiring privacy
harm to be “special” in order to proceed anonymously); see also Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(4)(a) (2010); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(d); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2003); Fed.
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confronted the question of whether the Privacy Act of 1974 requires a
plaintiff to show “actual damages” before recovery.5 The Court held that
the plaintiffs, whose social security numbers the government had sent to
various unauthorized parties, had to show that the technical violation of
the Act actually harmed them.6 They were not able to do so and the Court
dismissed the case.
This was a strange way to read the plain text. Where, as stipulated
in Chao, the United States violates the relevant provisions of the statute,
the Privacy Act says that “the United States shall be liable to the
individual in an amount equal to the sum of actual damages sustained by
the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a
person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.”7 The
natural way to read this language is that anyone whose data is released in
contravention of the Act receives up to the actual damages that resulted,
but at least $1,000.
In fairness, the Privacy Act also requires that the government’s
failure to comply with the Act must occur “in such a way as to have an
adverse effect on an individual” to qualify for civil remedy.8 Maybe the
social security numbers in Chao had no such effect. But Chao was not
the last word on harm in the context of the Privacy Act.
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Federal Aviation
Administration v. Cooper.9 At issue was whether a licensed pilot named
Stanmore Cooper could sue the Social Security Administration for
disclosing his human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status to the Federal
Aviation Administration in contravention of the Privacy Act. The
consequence was “adverse,” to put too mildly: Cooper lost his job and
was charged criminally. Nevertheless, and while acknowledging that the
term “actual damages” “is sometimes understood to include nonpecuniary harm,” the Cooper Court adopted “an interpretation of ‘actual
damages’ limited to pecuniary or economic harm.”10
Let me summarize the state of the law around the Privacy Act: A
person who was abjectly humiliated by the widespread release of highly
personal information by the government would be entitled to no
Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1441 (2012).
5. Doe, 540 U.S. at 614.
6. Id.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(a).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(d).
9. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1441.
10. Id. at 1453. In Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a similar
claim in which the plaintiff, a police officer, lamented an “investigation” into whether his
religious views affected his policing duties. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing
because any perceived harm did not amount to a “substantial” injury. 27 F.3d 1385, 1388-89,
1395 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1000 (1994).
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compensation under Chao or Cooper. Whereas a person who suffered
one dollar in damages due to a minor violation would recover a thousand
dollars.11
A high threshold for privacy harm is not limited to the Supreme
Court, or to courts in general. Legal scholars pose equally difficult
challenges to their colleagues. A variety of scholars have made progress
in theorizing and measuring privacy harm, lending the concept a
structure and depth that meets or exceeds that of other subjective
harms.12 But it never seems enough, as demonstrated by critiques ranging
far across the ideological spectrum. Thus, for instance, libertarian Adam
Thierer equates the search for privacy harm with the “quixotic” quest for
harm to happiness.13 He concludes that without a showing of harm
regulators should tread very lightly when it comes to information.
Whereas feminist legal theorist Ann Bartow demands of Daniel Solove
that his case for privacy harm furnish nothing short of “dead bodies” to
establish the significance of the field.14
II.
The (impossibly) high bar that some jurists and scholars expect
privacy harm to overcome is suspicious for a few reasons. First, privacy
is only one of a wide variety of contexts in which the harm is in some
sense “ethereal.”15 The tort of assault—where the harm is the emotion of
fear—dates back six and a half centuries.16 Today a wide variety of torts,
from loss of consortium to intentional infliction of emotional distress,
compensate emotional harm.17 Obviously there are line-drawing
problems: courts worry about fraud, idiosyncrasy, and the lack of a
limiting principle. That is why the tort of assault requires imminence.
But this concern is at least analytically distinct from the question of
whether the category of harm the plaintiff experienced is compensable.

11. Can you think of a hypothetical, meanwhile, where a violation of the Privacy Act
would result in concrete pecuniary harm of this variety? Recall that Mr. Cooper himself lost
his pilots’ license and therefore his entire livelihood.
12. E.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011);
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the
Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy,
97 MINN. L. REV. 907 (2013).
13. Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is
Failing, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 414–17 (2013).
14. Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 52, 52
(2007).
15. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 139 (1992).
16. I de S et Ux. v. W de S, Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, fol. 99, pl. 60 (1348). How the harm of
unhappiness is any less quixotic than the harm of fear eludes me.
17. See Levit, supra note 15, at 140–58 (discussing examples).
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Second, privacy harm exceptionalists disregard an option available
to courts and regulators that care about privacy: they could simply
assume harm upon a showing of violation. Because policymakers do
assume harm sometimes. For instance, no showing of actual harm is
necessary for the Federal Trade Commission to pursue a deceptive
practice. We have decided that deceiving consumers is harmful in its
own right. Moreover, some statutes set minimum damages precisely in
order to sidestep the necessity of calculating the effect of a violation.18 I
would argue that is exactly what Congress was up to with the Privacy
Act, notwithstanding the Court’s interpretive calisthenics to the contrary.
There is, finally, an even more basic and intuitive point to be made.
In the history of the world, there has never been a multi-billion dollar
industry that has not generated negative externalities: energy, finance,
transportation, food, drugs, the list goes on. Every single one of them has
imposed costs in the form of pollution, instability, physical injury, or side
effects. No major human activity is without a downside. And yet, for
some reason, quite a lot of people seem to hold the implicit belief that the
online advertising or data broker industries are exceptional, rather than
assume that the side-effect merely takes some time fully to materialize.
Now that would be exceptional.
III.
The common law created four causes of action, the Congress wrote
a statute, the FTC created a separate division, all for a reason. Yes, we
should proceed cautiously in regulating information; I have argued so in
the past.19 We need to be creative, as no single set of rules is likely to
resolve the problems that information privacy generates. I am also wary
of sweeping statements, like those famous words of Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis, that emotional and spiritual harm is somehow a higher
priority than broken bones or ruined property.20 But the wise and proper
reaction to the ongoing illusiveness of privacy harm is not to require
victims or scholars to move theoretical or evidentiary mountains before
they see recovery (and with it deterrence). Rather, the appropriate
reaction is to roll up one’s sleeves and figure out the nature of this harm
as we’ve done with some many others.

18. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) (2010) (providing for minimum damages of
$200 or $750 for copyright infringement depending on the awareness of the infringer).
19. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012).
20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).

